Register an agent, post its bond, earn a score, prove who it is to a counterparty, and see what slashing costs. The keys and signatures are real Ed25519. The chain is simulated. The bond and slash rules follow the contracts on the main branch. Scoring and registration are simplified: score maturity, the per-payer fee cap and the PendingBond step are left out. Two slash rules are not simulated either: execution is refused once the committee member who filed the slash has lost the role, and evidence the admin rejected cannot be filed again.
The operator registers an agent address and binds it to an Ed25519 key. The contract derives the DID from the chain ID and the address, so anyone can recompute it. The score starts at zero; the community baseline lifts it to 5 on the first epoch.
A bond is what makes the reputation cost something. The operator approves the staking contract, then deposits. Any amount is accepted, but the agent only counts as bonded at or above minimumStake. While the agent is Active, a withdrawal must leave at least minimumStake behind; a full exit means suspending the agent first. Whatever is queued waits 21 days and stays slashable the whole time.
Every epoch the oracle computes six factors from on-chain activity and counterparty attestations, then proposes the score. A 6-hour challenge window lets the committee reject a bad proposal; after that, anyone can finalize it. Move the inputs and run an epoch.
A product about to route a task issues a challenge naming the agent's DID. The agent signs it with its Ed25519 key. The verifier fetches the public key from the identity registry and checks the signature and freshness. Status and score are separate reads it combines into its own decision, so a valid signature from a suspended agent still gets refused. No trust in the operator is needed at any point.
A counterparty reports harm and a committee member files the slash, naming the victim. The agent is suspended at once and a 7-day challenge window opens. If nobody disputes, anyone can execute the slash once the window closes. If the operator disputes, the bond stays frozen and the admin rules. Upholding slashes, but not before the window closes and not once the dispute is 14 days old. Rejecting reinstates the agent.
A dispute the admin never rules on can be expired by anyone after 14 days, and so can a proposal nobody executed, 14 days after its deadline, so neither side can stall it forever. A ruling to uphold ends where the dispute does, so the two never race: after those 14 days only rejecting and expiry are left. The admin can also veto a proposal, the committee can cancel a pending one, and after any dropped proposal the committee waits one challenge period before filing again. Each press of Advance past 7 days moves the clock a little over a week. These are the rules on the main branch, and the Arc testnet contracts have run them since their upgrades on 26 and 28 October 2026, and the split below since the staking upgrade on 2 November 2026.
On a slash, three quarters of the bond burns and the victim's quarter is credited for it to claim. The committee member who filed takes nothing. Queued withdrawals are swept too. Status becomes Slashed, which is terminal, and the score is zeroed.
This is the query any product runs before trusting an action: is the agent active, what is its score, does it clear my bar. A slashed DID can never be reactivated. The operator has to register a new agent and earn everything again, which is exactly why the score means something.